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Introduction
One of the main challenges of biology consists in articulating a coherent view of the central nervous system and its structure. 
To this end, neuroscience has emerged as an interdisciplinary project which looks to integrate the different disciplines. 
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But, inasfar as it looks for an explanation of the central features of a human being, neuroscience goes beyond the 
boundaries of natural science and enters terrain which has already been explored, since antiquity, by philosophy. At this 
point an alternative appears.
First Attitude: Natural science must replace philosophy
But this attitude is not free from difficulties. Here are some of them:
a. It ignores many questions, concepts and findings made by philosophers 
since antiquity.
b. It enforces a reduction of the subject of understanding in order to make it 
empirically tractable, namely, analysable according to present standards of 
science, losing thereby some of their more relevant aspects.
c. Reductivism also encourages further reductive ways of presenting the 
results and achievements of neuroscience, many of which raise doubts and 
concern in the public. Some of these results, for example, involve that freedom is 
an illusion, a suggestion which affects man’s self-image, the relation between 
doctor and patient and even social interaction. These concerns can be potentially 
damaging for science as a whole. 
Natural sciences are the right and definitive scientific approach to those matters previously explored by 
philosophy, as, for example, consciousness, knowledge, freedom and personal identity
Second attitude: philosophy has an irreplaceable role to play
Philosophy affords the method which should be adopted to eschew naïve and reductive 
approaches to issues that concern specially intractable problems, such as the problem of the 
inner experience. It also contributes to the debate with ontology and ethics
This demands an integration of philosophy into the design of experiments and the 
interpretation of their resulting data:
1) It accurately defines the meaning of the concepts involved when topics hardly reducible 
to empirical method are at stake, such as consciousness, feelings, freedom and identity.
2) It rightly addresses the question about the imports of these topics in science and 
coherently integrates the different results.
3) Finally, philosophy is relevant not only in methodological issues. It can adequately deal 
with presenting scientific results and their application to public opinion, adequately taking 
ethical issues into account (4).
This demands bringing the empirical method of science into dialogue with contemporary 
streams and traditions in the philosophy of biology, philosophy of mind, epistemology and 
ethics. This should be done in a way that is rendered coherent by their common roots in a 
tradition of understanding the whole human being that stretches back to Aristotle. 
Philosophical methodologies
Analitic philosophy
can contribute to a better definition of 
problems and concepts (1).
Phenomenology 
can offer a rich and valuable 
basis for better understanding of inner 
experience (2).
Philosophical anthropology
can avoid dualistic 
errors by providing a coherent account 
of the inseparability of interiority -
mental life-, and exteriority —brain 
functions—, in living beings, 
understanding the brain as a relational 
organ (3).
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